Drive Attack Tree Desk from your own code

HTTP 2xx   { "data":  { ... } }
HTTP 4xx   { "error": { "code": "...", "message": "...", "details": { ... } } }

// Node 18+.  curl -sSO https://attack-tree-desk.skillsafe.ai/atree.js
const fs = require("node:fs");
const Atree = require("./atree.js");

const tree = fs.readFileSync("tree.txt", "utf8");   // the outline below, or the skill's export_json JSON
const analysis = Atree.analyze(tree);
if (!analysis.ok) throw new Error(analysis.errors.join(" "));

const input = Atree.buildReviewInput(analysis, {
  context: "Consumer web app with email + password login, optional TOTP, and a phone support desk that can reset accounts.",
  question: "",                                      // optional; empty means not sent
});
fs.writeFileSync("review.json", JSON.stringify(input));   // the body for /estimate, /run, /run-stream

// The build lane goes through the same kind of builder:
const build = Atree.buildBuildInput({ goal: "...", description: "...", attacker: "", question: "" });

# Account takeover - adapted from the attack-tree-construction skill's worked example
G1 [OR] Take over a user account
  S1 [OR] Steal credentials
    A1 Phishing attack | difficulty=low cost=low detection=medium time=4h | mitigations: security awareness training (in place); email filtering (in place)
    A2 Credential stuffing | difficulty=trivial cost=low detection=high time=2h | mitigations: rate limiting (in place); MFA (planned); password breach monitoring
    A3 Keylogger malware | difficulty=medium cost=medium detection=medium time=24h | mitigations: endpoint protection; MFA (planned)
  S2 [OR] Bypass authentication
    A4 Session hijacking | difficulty=medium cost=low detection=low time=8h | mitigations: secure session management (in place); HTTPS only (in place)
    A5 Authentication bypass vulnerability | difficulty=high cost=low detection=low time=40h | mitigations: security testing; code review; WAF
  S3 [OR] Social engineering
    S3.1 [AND] Account recovery attack
      A6 Gather personal information | difficulty=low cost=free detection=none time=4h
      A7 Call the support desk | difficulty=medium cost=free detection=medium time=1h | mitigations: support verification procedures; security questions

{
  "task": "build",
  "goal": "Divert employees' net pay to accounts the attacker controls",
  "description": "Quellwage is an HR and payroll portal for companies of 50-2,000 staff.\nEmployees sign in with email + password; SSO via the customer's identity provider is optional and about 40% of tenants use it. TOTP is optional for password users.\nAn employee can change their own bank account in Profile > Direct deposit. The change sends a confirmation email to the address on file and takes effect on the next pay run; there is no waiting period.\nHR administrators can edit any employee's bank details and can bulk-import changes from a CSV upload.\nPayroll is approved by a customer payroll admin, then Quellwage generates an ACH file that is sent to the partner bank by SFTP from a batch server.\nQuellwage support agents can reset an employee's password and email address after a phone call; they verify the caller with date of birth and the last 4 digits of the national ID.\nThe public API has a token per tenant with full HR scope; tokens do not expire.",
  "attacker": "Financially motivated outsider; may recruit or impersonate an insider."
}

{
  "lane": "build",
  "goal": "the root goal, restated as one attacker objective",
  "assumptions": ["an assumption the tree depends on that the description does not settle"],
  "out_of_scope": ["an attack family deliberately left out, and why"],
  "tree": "G1 [OR] ...\n  S1 [OR] ...\n    A1 ... | difficulty=... cost=... detection=... time=...h | mitigations: ...",
  "step_notes": [{ "node": "A1", "basis": "the fact in the description that makes this step possible" }],
  "open_questions": ["something the description does not say that would change a branch or an estimate"],
  "summary": "2-3 sentences: the shape of the tree and where it looks weakest"
}

{
  "task": "review",
  "facts": "{\"goal\":\"Take over a user account\",\"root\":\"G1\",\"title\":\"Account takeover - adapted from the attack-tree-construction skill's worked example\",\"scales\":{...},\"rules\":\"OR = any child reaches the parent; AND = every child is required. ...\",\"counts\":{\"nodes\":12,\"leaves\":7,\"and_gates\":1,\"or_gates\":4,\"depth\":3,\"nodes_sent\":12,\"scenarios\":6,...},\"nodes\":[...],\"best_paths\":{...},\"cheapest_open\":{...},\"cuts\":[...],\"critical\":[...],\"flags\":[...],\"verdict_floor\":\"revise_first\"}",
  "context": "Consumer web app with email + password login, optional TOTP, and a phone support desk that can reset accounts."
}

"nodes": [
  { "id": "S3", "type": "or", "name": "Social engineering", "parent": "G1", "depth": 1,
    "children": ["S3.1"], "rollup": { "difficulty": "medium", "cost": 0, "detection": "medium", "time_h": 5 } },
  { "id": "A2", "type": "leaf", "name": "Credential stuffing", "parent": "S1", "depth": 2,
    "difficulty": "trivial", "cost": "low", "detection": "high", "time_h": 2,
    "in_place": ["rate limiting"], "not_in_place": ["MFA (planned)", "password breach monitoring"], "scenarios": 1 },
  ...
],
"best_paths": { "cheapest": { "leaves": ["A6", "A7"], "steps": 2, "cost": 0, "difficulty": "medium", "detection": "medium",
                              "time_h": 5, "insider": false, "physical": false, "meets_in_place_control": false }, ... },
"cuts": [ { "id": "C1", "leaves": ["A1", "A2", "A3", "A4", "A5", "A6"], "size": 6, "new_controls": 3 }, ... ],
"critical": [ { "leaf": "A1", "scenarios": 1, "share_pct": 16.67 }, ... ],
"flags": [
  { "id": "X1", "code": "single_child_gate", "severity": "warn", "nodes": ["S3"],
    "detail": "A gate with exactly one child does not choose or combine anything: S3. Either the node is a label or a sibling step is missing." },
  { "id": "X2", "code": "no_mitigation", "severity": "warn", "nodes": ["A6"], "detail": "1 step(s) name no mitigation at all: A6." },
  ...
],
"verdict_floor": "revise_first"

{
  "lane": "review",
  "verdict": "ready_for_review | revise_first | restructure",
  "headline": "one sentence: can this tree go in front of a security review or stakeholders, and why",
  "flag_responses": [{ "flag": "X1", "explanation": "...", "action": "..." }],
  "gate_checks": [{ "node": "S3", "now": "OR", "should_be": "AND | OR | collapse | keep", "reason": "..." }],
  "estimate_challenges": [{ "node": "A2", "attribute": "difficulty | cost | detection | time_h", "now": "trivial", "suggest": "low", "reason": "..." }],
  "missing_branches": [{ "parent": "S3", "lines": "new tree lines in the grammar", "category": "technical | social | process | supply_chain | insider | physical", "reason": "..." }],
  "defense_plan": [{ "cut": "C1", "steps": ["A1", "A2", "A3", "A4", "A5", "A6"], "controls": ["..."], "why": "..." }],
  "stakeholder_brief": "3-5 sentences for a non-security reader",
  "summary": "2-3 sentences for the reviewer who reads nothing else"
}

# bash; needs curl 7.76+ (--fail-with-body) and jq.
BASE="https://api.skillsafe.ai/v1/app-api"
TOKEN="${SKILLSAFE_TOKEN:-YOUR_TOKEN}"      # from https://attack-tree-desk.skillsafe.ai/tokens.html

# api METHOD PATH [BODY_FILE] [extra curl args...]
# Prints the response body; exits non-zero on a 4xx/5xx (the body is still printed).
api() {
  local method="$1" path="$2" body="${3:-}"
  shift 2; [ $# -gt 0 ] && shift
  local args=(-sS --fail-with-body -X "$method" "$BASE$path" -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN")
  [ -n "$body" ] && args+=(-H "Content-Type: application/json" --data-binary "@$body")
  curl "${args[@]}" "$@"
}

# Personal token (needed for runs): sign in at
#   https://attack-tree-desk.skillsafe.ai/tokens.html
# and press "Copy shell export".
#
# Guest token (enough for /me and /estimate):
curl -sS -X POST "https://api.skillsafe.ai/v1/app-api/guest" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"slug":"attack-tree-desk"}' | jq '.data | {token, guest_id}'

api GET /me | jq '.data | {subject_type, subject_id, credits}'

api POST /estimate review.json | jq '.data | {hold_credits, min_credits, sponsor_enabled, warnings}'

LANE=$(jq -r .task review.json)
KEY="attack-tree-desk:$LANE:$(shasum -a 256 review.json | cut -c1-16):a1"

JOB=$(api POST /run review.json -H "Idempotency-Key: $KEY" | jq -r '.data.job_id')
while :; do
  J=$(api GET "/jobs/$JOB")
  S=$(printf '%s' "$J" | jq -r '.data.status')
  if [ "$S" = succeeded ] || [ "$S" = failed ]; then break; fi
  sleep 1
done
printf '%s' "$J" | jq '.data | {status, charged_credits, truncated, error}'

# The reply is ONE JSON object as text in data.output.output; cut from the first { to the last }:
printf '%s' "$J" | jq '.data.output.output | .[index("{"):rindex("}")+1] | fromjson'

LANE=$(jq -r .task review.json)
KEY="attack-tree-desk:$LANE:$(shasum -a 256 review.json | cut -c1-16):a1"

# -N turns off buffering so events print as they arrive.
curl -sS -N -X POST "$BASE/run-stream" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -H "Idempotency-Key: $KEY" \
  --data-binary @review.json
# Each block is "event: NAME" then "data: {JSON}", then a blank line.
# NAME is job, delta, done / pending (the final payload with output.output) or error.